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HISTORICAL NATURE OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
HOWARD L. OLECKt
THE function of Equity is the correction of the (civil or common)
law where it is deficient by reason of its universality (i.e.: its
tendency to establish rules without exceptions).' In this broad, general
sense, Equity is the body of principles which provide and govern ex-
ceptions to the law. But that is not all that Equity is.
"The English word 'law' means law and nothing else; but the corre-
sponding terms in Continental languages are ambiguous .... Recht, droit,
and diritto all have... [a] double signification.... [In] England the
term 'equity,' means either natural justice or that particular branch of
English law which was developed and applied by the Court of Chancery.
Continental speech conceals the difference between law and right,
whereas English speech conceals the connection between them."'2
The legal term "equity" is generally acknowledged to be impossible
to define completely. Almost everyone who has attempted to compose a
definition of this word has ended by capitulating to the general view
that the term has too many shades of meaning to be described definitive-
ly in one, or even several sentences.3 The fact that the word is much
used in popular speech is also a complicating factor. A typical college
dictionary defines the popular meaning of the word as follows: "Equity:
(ek-wi-ti), n., 1., justice; impartiality; just regard to any right or
claims; 2., the administration of law according to its spirit and not mere-
ly according to its letter. . . ."I Or: "Equity (ek-wi-ti), n; pl. ties
(-tiz). (OF. equite, fr. L. aequitas, fr. aequus, even, equal.) 1. State
or quality of being equal or fair; fairness in dealing. 2. That which is
equitable or fair. 3. Law. (a) The system of law which originated in
the extraordinary justice formerly administered by the king's chancellor
and was later developed into a body of rules supplementary to or aiding
the common and statute law. The term has come to designate the formal
system of legal and procedural rules and doctrines according to which
justice is administered within certain limits of jurisdiction. (b) An
equitable claim or right. 4. Hence, any body of legal doctrines and rules
'I Assistant Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. Aiusrom, Ermcs, V, xiv; CcVRao, DE OPAroR, I, § 57; Jus'mfr., PANDzcTs,
$0.17.85; BRAcToN, DE LEGIBUS ET cOiSUETUDIIIBUS AI GLE, I, iv, § S (1569); GnorlUs,
DE AEQmrrATE, c. 1, § 2 (1689) ("Haec Aequitas suggerit, etsi jure deficiamur.); S Puyrmn-
D0Sr, LAW OP NATURE C. 12, § 21 (Oldfather's transl. 1934); 1 SToRY, EQUITY JuRIs-
PRuDmE 3 (14th ed. 1918).
2. SALmo-n, Ju PRsDpENc 9 (7th ed. 1924).
3. Id. c. 1, 2.
4. W=nSi'ON, DicroNAvY 329 (College ed. 1943).
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similarly developed to enlarge, supplement, or override a system of law
which has become too narrow and rigid in its scope. 5. Colloq. The
amount or value of a property or properties above the total of liens or
charges."M
For purely introductory purposes, the following two principal mean-
ings in law are offered as preliminary sketch definitions, neither of
which is to be taken as a definitive description: First, equity is that
portion of the law which was developed by the English and American
courts of Chancery to remedy defects in the common law. Second, and
more important, it is that portion of the law which has been, or may be,
enunciated for the purpose of meliorating any harsh or otherwise un-
desirable effects resulting from the strict application of any particular
rule of law. The latter function is performed, also, by the legislative
authority, but that is too slow and cumbersome a method ever to be
likely to displace equity courts entirely. The very interpretation of
statutes themselves formerly was a matter unquestionably within the
province of equity. Today, though the doctrine of literal construction
of statutes now is the rule, justice, reason and common sense (what
might be termed "moral equity") remain the basis for construing stat-
utes.6 The superior adaptability of courts, as compared with legislatures,
in establishing rules to deal with many problems of procedure, as well
as of substance, as they arise, is patent in most situations.1
The description of equity as that law which was administered by the
old English courts of Chancery, of course, is hardly a definition. Yet,
that is the customary introductory description of equity.8 The net effect
of such an introduction is to suggest that it is necessary to know what
the law administered by English Chancery, courts was, in order to under-
stand what equity is. And that, in fact, is precisely what is intended
to be made apparent by such an introduction. It is intended that such a
definition be suggestive rather than precise and invite inquiry rather
than answer it.9 However, equity long antedates the court of Chancery
in England.1" And English Chancery is but a preliminary to consider-
5. WEBms R's NEW CoxxEOiATE DicnoNxAY 279 (2d ed. 1949).
6. McCaffrey, Equity of the Statute, Ancient and Modern, 119 N. Y. L. J. 2242, 2262,
2282, Col. 1 (Editorial, June 15, 16, 17, 1948). See also 47 MicHr. L. RaV. 1230 (1949); and
Baker, Legislating Judicially: Should the Power of Judicial Review be Curbed?, 35 A.
B. A. J. 555 (1949).
7. Cummings, The Functioning of Judicial Machinery, 33 J. Am. JUD. Soc. 175 (1950);
Baker, Legislating Judicially: Should the Power of Judicial Review be Curbed?, 35
A. B. A. J. 555 (1949); and Lenhoff, Extra-legislational Progress of Law-the Place of
the Judiciary in the Shaping of New Law, 28 NEB. L. REV. 542 (1949).
8. ALuTLAxW, EQurry, 1, 2 (2d ed. 1936).
9. BispuAw, EQUITy § 1 (11th ed. 1934).
10. i HOLDSWORTn, A HISTORY or ENGLiSH LAW 395 et seq. (6th ed. 1938).
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ation of the United States courts of Chancery, which exercised and
exercise powers like those of English and British Empire Chancery
courts."
Before touching upon the history of English equity, which explains
much of the true nature of equity today, it is desirable to sketch the
general purpose of equity in its universal moral sense. In this sense
the principal function of equity is to make more just the actual effect
of the application of any rule of law, not excluding even the pre-existing
rules of equity itself. Viewed in this light equity is, or should be, a
living, changing thing, forever adapting itself to new conditions; in its
ultimate sense it is a supreme law, acting upon and modifying codes,
statutes, and case law. The avoidance of the freezing of law into in-
flexible rules is one of its chief purposes.'
At first impression, such a body of law seems dangerous, in that it
lacks the certainty which law must provide. Law never should become
a vague, unpredictable matter of judicial whim.' Equity as a universal
moral principle supplies the required certainty by basing its decisions
on Principles, rather than on rules which have the defect of undesirable
rigidity. As long as these principles are sound, equity is sound. Such
principles must be universal, always, and beyond any dispute as to their
validity. And the chief principle upon which equity is founded, dearly,
is the principle that justice must be done, despite the seeming finality
of any rule of law, if that rule actually works an injustice.14 The same
general idea is conveyed by various other terms and phrases, such as
"conscience," and "bona fides," "the law of nature," "right and justice,"
"good morals," and so on.'8 Vague and apparently unpredictable as
this idea may seem, it is the real basis of equity. From the principles
of equity there has been developed, over a period of centuries, a structure
of equity rules which have the certainty and predictability without which
no law is practicable; and of this, more will be said later.
The nature of equity, administratively, is due primarily to its de-
velopment, historically, in England and the United States.'" Its nature
as an ideal juristic theory is much older and more universal. The two
11. WA sH, EQurr c. 1 (1930).
12. GROTms, DE AEQuITATE c. 1, § 2 (1639); SALuoXoN, JmsPauD ,cn 180 (7th ed.
1924).
13. LAWIRENcF, EQuIry Ju isPmuDxnca c. 1 (1929).
14. M NAE, ANCIE= LAW 50 (1912).
15. i Poi=oy, EQUTy JURISPRUDENCE § 2 (Sth ed. 1942); and Roelker, Afearing of
"Aequitas", "Aequus', and "Aeque" in the Code of Canon Law, 6 JuMSr 239 (1946).
For an excellent exposition of the nature of "Natural Law" see Schmidt, An Approach to
the Natural Law, 19 FoRD. L. REv. 1 (1950).




phases of equity have not developed pari-passu. Nevertheless, the two
phases should not be divorced from each other. They are two sides of
the same coin. A study of one is barren without consideration, at the
same time, of the other, and a study of either must begin with history.
ANCIENT HISTORY OF EQUITY
The oldest code of laws thus far discovered is the celebrated Code of
Hammurabi, discovered at Susa in Mesopotamia in 1902.11 The block
of black diorite on which the code is inscribed undoubtedly was carried
off from Babylon by a conquering Elamite king, and set up in Susa as
a trophy. The entire inscription, containing over 2,600 lines of text, has
been translated. 18 Hammurabi, a king of Babylonia, reigned some time
in the period 2400-2200 B.C.
The Code of Hammurabi represents a highly advanced and fairly com-
plex level of civilization. Babylonia actually was an amalgam, and the
heir of preceding nations which had flourished in the same area for a
long period before the ascendancy of Babylon. Sumerian, Akkadian,
Chaldean, Babylonian, Hebrew, Assyrian, Median and Persian cultures
all were phases of one long-continued civilization. Thus the code com-
piled by Hammurabi represents the product of civilized experience then
already covering a period of almost 3000 years preceding."0
While based on the primitive concept of the jus talionis-"an eye for
an eye, and a tooth for a tooth"-Hammurabi's code evidences the
summation of various grades of culture. Thus, the ordeal by water
undoubtedly originated in an era earlier than that in which were de-
veloped minute provisions governing property rights and inheritance. 20
Formal lawsuits and procedures were quite well developed in Ham-
murabi's day, and most of his code represents an accumulation of rules,
quite explicit and rigid in their application. Typical of these rules and
provisions are the following excerpts: Rule 25-"If a fire breaks out
in the house of a man, and some one who has gone thither to put it out
raises his eyes to the goods of the master of the house, that man shall
be thrown into the fire." And, Rule 167-"If a man has married a
woman, if she has borne him children, if that woman has gone to her
fate; if afterwards he has taken another wife, who has borne him chil-
dren, and if afterwards the father has gone to his fate; the children shall
17. Scheil, Memoires de la Delegation en Perse (4) in TEXTES ELANUTES SLMITIQUES
(1902). The discovery actually occurred in Dec.-Jan., 1901-2.
18. WINCHLER, DER ALTE ORIENT (1902), and JoHNs, TnE OLDEST CODE OF LAWS IN
TnE WORLD (1903).
19. 1 HiSTORMN'S HISTORY OF THE WORLD C. 7 (Williams) (1907).
20. JASTROW, THE RELIGION OF BABYLONIA AND ASSYRIA (1898); Hoebel, Fundamental
Legal Concepts as Applied in the Study of Primitive Law, 51 YALE L. J. 951 (1942).
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not divide the property according to their mothers; they shall take the
marriage portion of their mother; their father's property they shall
share in equal parts." Laws relating to commercial relations were
numerous, and show the existence of a highly developed system of
commerce.
The first suggestion'of a legal concept faintly resembling modern
equity also appears in Hammurabi's code. While resembling modern
"law" provisions, rather than modern "equity" provisions, these ancient
rules suggest a groping toward a righteousness which is more than ar-
bitrary statute law. Rule 42--"If anyone has taken a field to cultivate,
and has not made grain to grow in the fields, he shall be charged with
not having done his duty in the field; he shall give. grain equal to that
yielded by the neighboring field." And, Rule 4--"If a man has a
debt and a storm has devastated his field and carried off the harvest,
or if the grain has not grown on account of a lack of water, in that
year he shall give no grain to the creditor; he shall soak his tablet
[in water; i.e., alter it], and shall pay no interest for that year." This
is somewhat analogous to modern equitable relief.
The most remarkable evidence of the antiquity of the concept of
equity, however, is not found in the Code of Hammurabi itself. It is
found in various Sumerian-Assyrio-Chaldean tablets setting forth the
law as it existed a little later than the period of Hammurabi. One
maxim which is equity, without question, is found in various records
of trials which were held in Nineveh, Assyria and Chaldea. It is start-
lingly similar to the modern "maxims of equity."
"He who listeneth not to his conscience, the judge will not listen to his right."' 2
Equally pertinent is the fact that an appellate jurisdiction existed
in those ancient days, and that the final judge of appeals was the king. 2
Here is the very original of the pattern which was to reappear almost
4000 years later in England, and was to be acclaimed as a novel product
of English culture. The English kings and their chancellors, who estab-
lished the equity courts (Chancery) which we know today, seem to
have followed what now appears to be an almost inevitable pattern of
legal development. The appeal to the king is a recurring characteristic
of equity.2
The law and lore of the Assyrio-Babylonian culture were introduced
to the west through the Hebrews. Led by the venerable Abraham,
21. 1 HsroRni's HIsTORY or =E WoalD 495 (Williams) (1907); and B1&N.A,;T
DE couvERTEs AssYmmINlms; LA BIBLIOTHEQUE DU PALAIs DE Nn vE (18S0).
22. Ibid.
23. Palmer, The Ancient Roots of the Law: We Cannot Escape the Past, 35 A. B.
A. J. 633 (1949).
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the Hebrews came from Ur of the Chaldeans to what was then the
crossroads of the ancient world, Palestine. (circa 2000-1800 B.C.) "4
There, in intimate contact with the second great civilization of antiquity,
Egypt, the Hebrews elaborated the laws of their former home into the
monolithic body of law now known as the Mosaic Code, destined to be
the basis of much of the law of all the nations of the western world."
Closely resembling the codes of the Mesopotamian nations, the Mosaic
Code far surpassed them in its scope and detail. Moral principles intro-
duced by the Hebrews, distilled from their extraordinary religious
genius, lent to their code a strong feeling of morality, equity in its
broad sense. In fact the very term "equity" appears in the Old Testa-
ment: "To receive the instruction of wisdom, justice, and judgment,
and equity... . "I' While this may be due to its English rendition in the
King James Bible, the concept, in whatever terms, is biblical. Once
again, also, the right of appeal to the king appears. The story of the
judgment of Solomon is known to every schoolboy.
It is interesting to speculate upon what our laws would be like today,
if the Hebrews had not preserved their progenitor codes from the de-
struction that befell Assyria and Babylon. The brutal harshness of
the laws of the Medes and the Persians, the conquerors who overthrew
Assyrio-Babylonia, is proverbial. The very language of the ancient
empires vanished almost 3000 years ago. Not until the middle of the
eighteenth century was a start made on deciphering the records of
Assyria and Babylon."'
Later, with the addition of the New Testament, the Bible became the
very basis of all western civilization and law."8 Its nature is too well
known to need any description here. Suffice it to say that equity is its
very essence. Hebrew law, softened by Christianity and made orderly
by Roman practicality, was to become the law of the western world.29
Meanwhile, Egypt, only a little younger than the eastern empires,
rose to majestic stature in many ways, but not in the field of law. 0 The
funereal religion of Egypt and the dominance of its priests kept back
the development of law. The law was in the hands of the priesthood,
and the Pharoah was too remote from the people to be available for
appeals."
24. GENsis XI, xxxi.
25. OLD TESTAIMENT; ExoDusi LEvITIcus, NUImERS, DEUTERONOIY.
26. PROVERWS I, iii.
27. RAWLINSON, HISTORY OF AssYRm (1889); WINCxLER, GESCXICHTE DADYLONIENS
UND AssYRIEws (1892).
28. SAxmOxD, JURISPRUDENCE 24 (7th ed. 1924).
29. Ibid.
30. See HERODOTUS, HISTORY (Beloe's transl. 1806).
31. WILxn soN, POPULAR ACCOUNT op TnE ANCIENT EoypYIs (1854); CnA.n', omoN,
L'Eo Y" sous LES PHAROAONS (1814).
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Ancient Greece, the source of so much of our present culture, had
surprisingly little to contribute to the development of law or equity 2
The first written laws of Athens were the laws of Draco, distinguished
only by their severity. Draconian law became almost an epithet, and
these laws were said to have been written not in ink, but in blood.
About 600 B.C., the laws of Draco were entirely revised by Solon, who
also constituted the first real courts of justice in Greece. These courts
were constituted from among the citizens of Athens, and the panels of
judges were enrolled by lot, thus giving even the poorest citizen a
chance for judicial office, in most democratic fashion." But Solon's
laws were so drawn as to keep control of the chief offices in the rich
men's hands. "Furthermore because his laws were written somewhat
obscurely, and might be diversely taken and interpreted, this did give
a great deal more authority and power to the judges. For, considering
all their controversies could not be ended, and judged by express law:
they were driven of necessity always to run to the judges and debated
their matters before them. Insomuch as the judges by this means came
to be somewhat above the law; for they did even expound it as they
would themselves."" Here, perhaps, is the first instance in Greek
jurisprudence of interpretation of rules of law, which can be said to
resemble equity.3 6 Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) did point out that too
general rules of law might work actual injustice, and suggested that
meliorative interpretation was desirable in many cases37 Unfortunately,
the Greek courts already were becoming instruments of political ad-
vantage rather than seats of justice. Moreover, Aristotle's chief inter-
est was natural science rather than law.3 By about 400 B.C., in the
time of Aristophanes, the Greek courts had degenerated entirely into
the merest sounding boards for the display of forensic talent, and had
become so corrupt as to warrant little further consideration.P Ele-
ments of Greek jurisprudence are discernible in later Roman law, but
the Romans were not greatly indebted to Hellenic culture in this par-
ticular respect.
32. But see Russell, Greek Legal History-A Note, 6 CAm. U. Sm An 77 (1948);
and 1 TAYLOR, LAWS Or PLATO 624 (1934).
33. See Tm.wAI., Tns MsoRy or GREECE (1855).
34. See BuRy, A HISTORY or GREECE TO THE DzAsa or Az x,-DER Tim Gan-T (1927).
35. See PLTARaCE, Lrvas or Iu'usmsous AlE (Langhorne's transl. 1823).
36. See also: GRoTE, A HxsroaY oF GRaEE (Solon the Law-giver) (1907).
37. Chroust, Aristotles Conception of "Equity" (EPIEIKEIA), 18 Nornn DAIM LAW
119 (1942).
38. 4 Hx rOAx's HISTORy or = Woai-, 260 et seq. (1907).
39. See Aristophanes' Plays; THIw.X., HISTORY or GREECE (1855). See also S'O!,z,
PRovHicE Am FuNcnOx or LAw C. 8, § 2 (1950).
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It is quite probable that the real source of Roman civilization was
Etruria. This theory, now widely accepted, would explain logically
much about Rome that otherwise is inexplicable.4" The Etruscans were
an Asiatic people, and thus, probably brought with them to Italy the
laws of the Mesopotamian nations. Unfortunately, the Romans de-
stroyed or defaced Etruscan monuments, (which are found even under
the earliest ruins of the city of Rome), and the mysterious Etruscan
language still baffles the efforts of all philologists.4 Etruscan civiliza-
tion was highly developed before its destruction by a series of barbarian
assaults, of which the Roman attack was the last, and the fatal one.
Then Rome was a semi-barbaric city-state, not even noticed by the
outer world until the time of Aristotle (340 B.C.). Rome absorbed
the Etruscan culture which, together with the contacts and influence
of Phoenicia, and later of Carthage and Greece, undoubtedly trans-
mitted to Roman law many of the principles of law originated by the
Asiatic nations. The Romans, despite their characteristic brutality,
possessed great gifts of orderliness and logic, and were destined to
fashion out of diverse elements the first truly balanced system of juris-
prudence. In this body of law, equity (aequitas) was to have a leading
part.42 It should be noted, in passing, that Roman orderliness later led
to Roman bureaucracy."3
The first noteworthy body of Roman law was a code, subject to all
the defects of this inelastic form of jurisprudence. This was the Code
of the Twelve Tables of the Decemviri, established in 451 B.C.44 The
excessively harsh provisions of the Twelve Tables, modified somewhat
with the passage of time, remained the basis of Roman law for a long
period. By the time of the century before Christ it had become some-
what confused in its efforts to strike a balance between individual lib-
erty and the safeguarding of material interests." The Romans were
complete materialists. Moreover, even more than in other nations,
most of the inhabitants of. Rome were slaves. All law was .written pri-
marily for the benefit of the relatively small number of Romans who
were citizens and property (including slave) owners.
Legal proceedings under the Twelve Tables were highly formalized
and were carried on by means of a very few forms or writs, prescribed
40. WELLS, TnE OUTLINE OF HISTORY 382 (1921).
41. Ibid. See also LIDDELL, A HISTORY OF ROME (1893).
42. See Livy, HISTORY OF ROME.
43. Schller, Bureaucracy and the Roman Law, 7 CATII. U. SEMINAR 26 (1949).
44. KOCOUREK AND WIGXORE, SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRIIMITIVE LAWS (1915); and
HERTZBERO, GESCHICTE DER ROMER IN ALTERTHUM (1879).
45. BOUCHE-LE CLERCQ, MANUEL DES INSTITUTIONES ROmAINES (1886).
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for various types of actions, which were submitted to a magistrate40
If and when the highly technical forms of pleading were approved by
the magistrate, he sent the parties to a "Judex," who listened to the
testimony and handed down a judgment, much as a jury might do.
Then the magistrate reviewed the finding of the Judex and affirmed or
revised it.47 A magistrate bore the official title of "Praetor."'4  This
method of procedure was the praetors' "ordinary" jurisdiction. In addi-
tion, the praetors had an "extraordinary" jurisdiction to hear and de-
cide, without the employment of a Judex. In the extraordinary juris-
diction, a praetor decided a suit, including questions of law and of fact,
himself, without the technical restraints of forms or writs.49 This was
equity jurisdiction and procedure, quite comparable with modern prac-
tice. The "extraordinary" jurisdiction modified the harsh results of the
application of the stiff rules of "ordinary" jurisdiction.
Later, the functions of the praetors expanded greatly. They not only
determined suits, but also set forth law applicable to hypothetical
situations, first by greatly increasing the number of forms, or writs,
and then as a routine practice, apart from any forms." About 300 A.D.,
the employment of the Judex was abandoned, and the judges them-
selves handled all matters, much as equity courts do today. Prior to
this change, the "ordinary" and "extraordinary" technique of the
courts was equivalent to the early, separate, British and American
"common law" and "chancery" courts. The merger of both into one
court, which occurred in Rome, was emulated later in Britain and in
most of the states of the United States. It is significant that much of
the higher development of Roman law took place in the Eastern Em-
pire, early in the Christian Era.
The old civil code of Rome was supplanted, during this process, by an
amalgam of laws which the Romans termed the "natural law." By
this they meant a combination of the Ius Gentium (Law of Nations),
and the Lex Naturae (Law of Nature). This combination was called
Aequitas (Equity). The Law of Nations meant those laws which
were found to exist in the codes or rules of all nations. The Law of
Nature meant those laws which were universally recognized. The two
were much alike, and eventually merged. But Roman so-called natural
law should be distinguished from natural law as we know it today.0'
46. G~rus, 4. 61-3. See also note 44, supra.
47. 1 Poisuaoy, EQUITY JURISPRUD.iCE C. 1 (5th ed. 1942).
48. L:DDmEL, HISTORY or Roam (1893).
49. 1 PoiasRoy, op. dt. supra note 47, at 5 et seq.
50. RADi, RoasA LAW (1927).
51. Ibid. See also 1 PoaxaRoy, op. cit. supra note 47, at 5 el seq. For a good exposition




Gradually, the Roman judges abandoned the rules of the old civil
code as they found them to conflict with these principles of universal
law. At the same time new remedies thus made necessary were pro-
vided, as forms of action, or defenses. In time, repeated usage devel-
oped real certainty, and a new body of law existed. This was Equity.
Under the influence of Christianity, equity became the dominant, per-
vasive law.52 In 438 A. D., the Emperor Theodosius, (the younger),
ordered the compilation of a new code embodying these developments.
About a century later a recompilation was made, under the Emperor
Justinian 3 These later were to form the basis of Canon Law.14 They
usually were referred to as the (Roman) "Civil Law."
The development of equity in Britain was destined to parallel closely
its evolution in Rome, with certain important differences. Because of
the willingness of Roman judges to change what needed changing,
Roman Equity developed within the existing court structure. The
English judges were to resist any changes in their forms of action, and
thus, were to make necessary the establishment of a separate system of
courts and of jurisprudence. 55
The barbarian destruction of Rome left the Church as the principal,
and practically sole, repository of learning in the western world, through-
out the medieval period. From the time of the Emperor Constantine,
the Bishops served as the chief arbiters of their respective dioceses, and
Charlemagne even included this arrangement in his constitution."0 As
the ecclesiastical jurisprudence naturally tended to deal with persons
(in personam), rather than property (in rem), the Roman aequitas
was particularly apt for the purpose, and the equity of Rome was pre-
served and improved. Moreover, the range of church authority spread
over all of Europe, exercising a strong civilizing influence, and leaving
the impress of Roman law and equity on the new legal systems of the
European nations. This is most obvious in the development of French
law, and in the pre-code laws of the Germans, whose first contact with
civilization was obtained through the Romans. Its effect on English
Law was profound. From the English Law, of course, developed Ameri-
can law and equity. 7
52. 1 PomxRoY, op. cit. supra note 47, at 5 et seq.
53. JusTnI N, INsTiTuTFs (Elements and Principles), PAND cTs (Digests and Opinions),
NEw CODE (Imperial Constitutions), NovELs (Supplemental New Constitutions). See
Pringsheim, Character of Justinian's Legislation, 56 L. Q. REV. 229 (1940).
54. 1 BL. CoMM.. *81.
55. 1 PoRmEoY, EQuiTy JuRISPRUDENCE 12 (5th ed. 1942).
56. 1 LAWRENCE, EQuITY JURISPRUDENCE 42 (1929). See also STONE, PROVINCE AND
FuNcTIoN or LAW c. 8, § 24 (1950).
57. Coleman-Norton, Why Study Roman Law?, 2 J. LEG;AL EDUC. 473 (1950).
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ENGLISH HISTORY OF EQUITY
Before the Norman conquest (1066 A. D.) the law of England was
almost entirely rude "customary usage" administered by the courts of
the hundred and the shire, while the only law comparable with equity
was the arbitrament of the king and his council . 8 After the conquest
the same system prevailed under the local manor courts and county
courts, as to "customary" law, while appellate, special, or "equitable
relief" was available only from the king and his council. The king was
the source of all justice, having the power, whenever it was necessary
and proper, to do whatever was required by right and justice."9 In
addition, there existed a separate and distinct court for the benefit of
members of the nobility, called the Curia Regis.'I
Meanwhile, in 1120 A. D. the study of Roman Law was begun at the
University of Bologna, in Italy, thence to be extended throughout
western Europe. Lanfranc, William the Conqueror's Prime inister,
apparently was an Italian Professor of Law."' In 1143, Theobald, Arch-
bishop of Canterbury, who had learned Roman law at Bologna, brought
to England a great scholar of Roman law, Vacarius, who established
this study at the University of Oxford in 1149.0 "Bracton's celebrated
work, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae [Concerning the Laws
and Customs of the English], written between A. D. 1256 and 1259,
and which is an epitome or systematic institute of the common law as
it then existed, exhibits in the plainest manner the results of the judicial
labor and scientific study which had preceded it.0 A considerable
portion of its doctrines, and even of the terms in which its rules are
stated, is taken directly from standard treatises of the day upon Roman
jurisprudence.6 4 In the language of an eminent writer,' 'As Roman legal
matter obtained reception, although the written sources of the Roman
law were not at all received as having a legislative authority, Bracton
properly included such Roman legal matter among the leges et consue-
tudines Angliae." , 6  When one recalls that the first Chancellors of the
58. WALsH, EQUITY c. 1 (1930). See Adams, Origin of English Equity, 16 Cor. L. REv.
87 (1916); and T-r.=A, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 91-3, 133 (1937).
59. Ibid.
60. 1 HorswoRTH, A HisroRy or ENGLisr LAW 40 (6th ed. 1938).
61. Wigmore, Lanfranc, The Prime Minister of William the Conqueror: Was He once
an Italian Professor of Law?, 58 L. Q. REv. 61 (1942).
62. PoT rmoY, op. cit. supra note 55, at 18.
63. Blume, Bracton and His Time, 2 Wyo. L. J. 43 (1948); Reinhardt The Status of
the Crown in the Time of Bracton, 17 TEmp. L. Q. 242 (1943).
64. Pound, A Comparison of Systems of Law, 10 Pnis. L. REv. 271 (1948).
65. GUTEocY, BRACrOx J.ND HiS RLrT.ONs To rn Ro.mr= LAw 62 (Coxe transl.
1866).
66. 1 Pcmoy, op. cit. sura note 55, at 19. See also Forbes, European Law-Some
Early Stages, 60 Juam. R.zv. 31 (1948).
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king were churchmen, and that this situation continued for a long
time, it is hardly surprising that Roman and ecclesiastical law and
equity had so profound an effect on English law.07
King Henry the Second (1154-1189), whose wife was the romantically
celebrated Eleanor of Aquitaine, appointed as his Chancellor the dis-
tinguished churchman, and his bosom companion, Thomas 'a Becket.
Peter of Blois, Henry's biographer, wrote of this friendship that they
were "cor unum et animam" (of one heart and of one mind). Becket
had studied Roman law at Bologna, having been sent there by Arch-
bishop Theobald of Canterbury, and also at Auxerre, in Burgundy,
another leading school of the civil law. He also had served as Theobald's
personal emissary to Rome, and was steeped in Roman law. 8 His
magnificence and power as Henry's Chancellor were second only to
those of Henry himself. Under his direction the first national court
administering a single body of law for all of England was established.
A series of forms of action, or writs, directed toward jury verdicts
rather than trial by battle or oath helpers, was established. Most
of these writs pertained to rights in land, and to crimes, as Henry was
engaged in consolidating the royal power and cutting down the power
of the earls and barons. 9 This court sat regularly at Westminster,
and often at the Exchequer, and maintained a number of travelling
judges. These "judges in eyre" spread the domination of the king's
court, and reduced the authority of the local courts. Glanvil, Henry's
Chief Justice, developed the writs, particularly the writ of assize, relating
to property. 7
It was ironic that Thomas . Becket, raised to the primacy of the
English church when Theobald died in 1161, should thereupon abandon
his worldly ways and become Henry's deadly foe in the struggle which
ensued between church and state. His death at the hands of some of
Henry's overzealous retainers is a well-known bit of historical drama.
But, before that, in 1164, under the pressure of the king, and apparently
of the Pope himself, he had signed the famous Constitutions of Claren-
don, which later were rejected by the Pope but remained effective in
England.7 ' The most important points of the Constitutions of Clarendon
were as follows: Disputes concerning advowsons (the right to present
to a bishop a person fit to be appointed to a benefice) 72 and presenta-
67. 1 BL. Co?,ai. *81 et seq. See also Holdsworth, The Relation of English Law to Inter-
national Law, 26 MINN. L. REv. 141 (1942).
68. FITZSTEPHEx, LIFE OF BECKET (Vita Sancti Thomae) (12th Cent.). Quoted In
18 HISTORIAN'S HISTORY OF THE WORLD 297 (1907).
69. NORGATE, ENGLAND UNDER THE ANGEVIN KINGS (1887).
70. 3 BL. COMM. *184.
71. MACFARLANE AND THOMSON, THE COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF ENOLAND (1896).
72. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 69 (3d ed. 1933).
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tions were to be tried in the king's court; criminous clerks were to be
tried in the king's court; and appeals were to be allowed from the ec-
clesiastical courts to the king." The Constitutions formed the ground-
work of the later supreme authority of the king's courts, replacing the
until-then dominant ecclesiastical courts, as well as the manor courts."4
Thereupon the Curia Regis and its law became the court and the common
law of the nation. But it should be understood that this development
of the "common law" was a special gift from the king, which only he
could grant, or withhold.-, An individual was entitled to redress from
the local court, if it had an appropriate writ for his case; he only might
beg the intercession of the king's court in special circumstances, or if
the local court could not, or would not aid him.7"
The. Chancellor, secretary to the king, and "keeper of the king's
conscience," soon took over from the king the burden of administering
the king's justice. Later, after a sufficient number of cases had arisen
and had been decided in this manner, writs were issued by the chancel-
lor's court in any case based on similar facts. These writs in turn were
to become formalized and later still, a new set of special "equity"
rules was to become necessary, to relieve the rigidity of the first set
of chancellor's writs. These first writs of the chancellor, together with
the pre-existing writs, became the routine forms of legal redress, for
what we now call "common law." The later series of remedial rules
were the ones which became "equity. ' 7 It was not until later, however,
that the court of "Chancery" reached full stature, and became the
"Court of Equity" which enunciated these latter, remedial rules of
'"equity.''
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries any remedy beyond the limited
power of a local court could be had only by the king's assistance. This
was obtained by applying to the king's chancellor, addressing, through
him, a petition to the king. The Chancery then would issue an "original
writ," which gave authority to the king's court (a branch of the Curia
Regis) to hear and determine the matter." This latter court had
powers which combined the characteristics now separately labeled
"common law" and "equitable." These gradually solidified into a limited
group applicable to a certain number of well-defined types of cases.7"
73. 18 HISToRiAx's HISTORY OF T3HE WORLD 267 (1,07).
74. STUBBS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY or ENGLAND (5th ed. 1891).
75. Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COL. L. Rix. 87 (1916).
76. Adams, Continuity of English Equity, 26 YALE L. J. 550 (1917). Al-o, WAtSH,
EQUITY 4 (1930).
77. ,IcC~nocK, EQUITY 4 (2d ed. 1948).




The writs available for this group of case types were the "common law
writs." To the King's Court were added, in turn, the court of the
Exchequer, the court of Common Pleas, and the court of the King's
Bench,--all common law courts, and all approachable for special relief
only on the authority of a writ issued by the Chancery. 0
The freezing of the common law writs into a rigid system made it im-
possible for many petitioners to obtain writs appropriate to their pe-
culiar problems. Without appropriate writs, they could obtain no ad-
equate redress from the common law courts. Of necessity, therefore,
their problems were again addressed to the Chancellor, the King's sec-
retary and keeper of the king's seal, usually a bishop, and usually fa-
miliar with the aequitas of Roman law.s" By the time of Richard the
Second (1377-1399) the chancellor's office had developed a court to
deal with such problems. This was the Court of Chancery (Curia Can-
cellariae) .2 The need for it originated in the tendency of the common
law courts to become firmly settled into a policy of confining their juris-
diction to cases which fitted their customary writs (brevia de cursu,
or writs of course). Even when, in the reign of Edward the First (1272-
1307), Chancery was enpowered to issue new writs (breve magistralis,
and writs in consimili casu) to deal with new situations, it met resistance
from the common law courts which could, and often did, throw out the
writ as unlawful.8 3 Then the chancellor, as the repository of the king's
legal authority and power, employed that power directly, as a supple-
ment to the already existing common law (writ-issuing) side of his
authority. This new, special exercise of judicial power was the meliora-
tive (equitable) side, employed to effect justice where the "law" side
could not or would not do so.84
It is apparent that the Curia Regis, and the common law, easily could
have maintained flexibility and liberality by accepting the new writs
issued by the Chancery. Had the common law courts accepted these
necessary innovations, instead of becoming bemused by form and prece-
dent, there would have been no need for the creation of a special, com-
peting court and system of law." Instead, the common law became a
narrow, formalistic system, confined to the method of granting relief
by the award of damages after an injury had been suffered. Other,
preventive or special relief was not available from the common law
courts. The only exception to this state of affairs was found in the
80. GLENN AND REDDEN, CASES ON EQuiTY 8 (1946).
81. -AITLAND, EQUITY 2 (2d ed. 1936).
82. Ibid.
83. Id. at 2 et seq.
84. 1 HOLDSWORTE, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 401 et seq. (6th ed. 1938).
85. Note, Interpretations of English Medieval History, 207 L.T. 367 (1949).
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willingness of the common law to accept suits for the recovery of land.
And this is especially strange when it is remembered that the old manor
courts usually had granted specific relief rather than damagesPu
Political tensions and rivalries had important, though often unpre-
dictable, effects on the development of law, then as now. Henry the
Third (1216-1272), a weak king, often at odds with his earls and barons,
was forced to sign away some of his powers at a parliament held at
Oxford in 1258. In order to weaken the chancellor, of whose powers
they were jealous, the lords, led by the Earl of Leicester (Simon de
Montfort, the younger), had inserted in the Provisions of Oxford the
rule that the chancellor could not establish new writs except with the
consent of the council and the king. 7 The effect of this rule was the
practical cessation of the creation of new writs, which were only of
academic interest to the council and the king. Thus, the lords, seeking
to weaken the chancellor, actually laid the basis for the magnification
of chancery. If the chancellor could not create a new writ with which
to send a petitioner to the common law courts, he could do something
better,-he could keep the petitioner's entire matter within his own
chancery. Nor did the later provisions for writs in consinli ca.t
(similar cases), provided in the Statute of Westminster Second' by
the alternately just and vicious Edward the First, prove of much effect.P
The common law courts were adamant in rejecting the novel writs of
chancery.
Typical of the attitude of the common law courts was their rejection of
cases involving uses in land, which became commonplace in the reign
of Edward the Second (1307-1327)." Uses, and the trusts which suc-
ceeded them, and the vast field of jurisprudence allied with them, thus
were taken over by equity by default. 1 In addition, the common law
courts could render only a judgment for the plaintiff or a judgment for
the defendant, without any special modifications or provisions desirable
for the particular situation involved. Obviously, this took no account
of special assistance beyond the general relief, which often was needed.
Equity could and did provide for such special assistance, as its decree
could be so drawn a to suit the particular situation
2
Typical of the classes of cases taken over by chancery, because its
86. WALS , HIsTORy or ENGis tam A cw LAW § 77 (1923).
87. Humps, THE HISToRY oF E=oLmw (1890). See also KMLY, A.,; HSToXrCAL SIE=H
OF T EQUITABLE JuRISDICTION OF THE COURT or CiA=cERY (1890).
88. 13 Edw. 1., c., 24 (1285).
89. CAFraIB, LVS OF nm LoD 2- LL-rons (Mallory ed. 1876).
90. Thomas, Note on the t)rigin of Uses and Trusts, 3 So-rnvnsTER L. J. 162 (1949).
91. 1 Pommoy, EQuITY JUMsPRUDENCE § 38 (5th ed. 1942).
92. BIsPHA-m, PmTINci.Es or EQurry 7 (11th ed. 1934).
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extraordinary jurisdiction could effect substantial justice, and the com-
mon law could give only damages, in general, were the following: Uses
and trusts (already mentioned); assault and trespass, when the power,
or local influence, or violence of the tort-feasor made the common law
remedies futile; specific performance of contracts; injunctive restraint
of nuisances; relief from fraud; relief from mistake; and others of
similar tenor. 3 On the other hand, equity could not interfere when
the common law courts could offer an adequate remedy. A bill which
attempted to have equity so interfere was "demurrable for want of
equity.29
4
Necessarily, the chancellor, and then equity, could not effect sub-
stantial justice without by-passing precedent when a situation demanded
special treatment. This necessity, and the chancellors' placing of justice
above form, elicited ironic comment from the opponents of the new
technique. An interesting, though somewhat unfair comment, typical
of this critical attitude, much quoted even today, is that made by John
Selden (1584-1654). "Equity in Law is the same thing that the spirit
is in Religion, what every one pleases to make it. Some times they go ac-
cording to conscience . . .some time according to the Rule [i.e.: ruling
law] of the court. Equity is a Roguish thing, for Law we have a measure
know what to trust too. Equity is according to the conscience of him
that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower so is equity. 'Tis
all one as if they should make the Standard for the measure we call a
foot, to be the Chancellors Foot; what an uncertain measure would
this be; One Chancellor has a long foot another a short foot a third an
indifferent foot; 'tis the same thing in the Chancellors Conscience.""9 But
oppose to this the following remarks of Sir Joseph Jekyll in Cowper v.
Earl Cowper:96 "... the discretion which is exercised here, is to be
governed by the rules of law and equity, which are not to oppose, but
each, in turn, to be subservient to the other; this discretion, in some
cases, follows the law implicitly, in others, assists it, and advances
the remedy; in others again, it relieves against the abuse, or allays the
rigour of it; but in no case does it contradict or over-turn the grounds
or principles thereof, as has been sometimes ignorantly imputed to
this Court. That is a discretionary power, which neither this nor any
other Court, not even the highest, acting in a judicial capacity, is by
the constitution entrusted with." 7 Selden spoke of the discretion of
93. Id. at 9.
94. MAITLAN, EQurr 2 et seq. (2d ed. 1936); and 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§§ 20-8 (14th ed. 1918).
95. SELDEN, TABLE TALx 43 (Pollock ed. 1927),
96. 2 P. Wms. 752, 24 Eng. Rep. 930 (1734).
97. Id at 753, 24 Eng. Rep. at 942.
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the chancellor, but this discretion is vested in the court of chancery,
not in the chancellor, and that is a very different matter. Being vested
in the court, the rules of equity, applied and re-applied in similar cases,
settled into definite, predictable law. Then the Chancellor's Foot be-
came of standard size.s
In 1515, in the reign of Henry the Eighth, Cardinal Wolsey served
as the last great ecclesiastic to hold the title of Chancellor. 2 There-
after, with one exception in Charles the First's reign (1625-1649), the
chancellors were not churchmen.1"' Some ideas originated and developed
by equity began to be crystallized into statutory form. For example,
the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, the first statute governing fraudulent con-
veyances (1570), was based on chancery experience. 0 1 Reports of
cases began to be published and settled rules of procedure were de-
veloped. Sir Edward Coke, (1552-1634), great English common law
jurist, brought the issue of common law vis-a-vis equity to final decision,
against the celebrated Lord Ellesmere, and went down to final defeat.' 02
This contest arose when the chancellor, acting through equity's "in
personam" authority, enjoined individuals who had won common law
judgments, from enforcing those judgments when their literal enforce-
ment would work actual injustice. This was deemed an affront by the
common law judges, and Coke declared that such injunctions were un-
lawful under the Statutes of Praemunire (enacted to weaken the Papal
courts), because they sought to override the judgments of the King's
Courts.'13 Francis Bacon, Viscount St. Albans, then Lord Chancellor,
advised James the First against Coke's view, which advice suited King
James' desire to appear to be supreme over all the courts and judges. 04
He ruled in favor of equity, which thereafter never again was seriously
challenged as a system of law. Incidentally, Bacon thereby won the
undying hatred of Coke, who later was instrumental in Bacon's dis-
grace and trial on charges of bribery and corruption." In any event,
from that time forward, chancery was at least equal in standing with
the law courts. More, it could prevent the employment of the law
courts in certain cases, while the law courts could not prevent the em-
ployment of equity courts. A fortunate succession of capable chan-
cellors developed equity, in succeeding years,-among them such famous
98. See also: STAFFORD, HANDECO, Or EQTUITY C. 7 (1934).
99. CAVEN¢DiSH, THE Li-E OF CARDn;AL WOLSEY (1852).
100. CAxuBELL, LiEs OF THE LORD CHANCELORS (Mlallory ed. 1876).
101. OIXCYc, CREDITOR'S RIGHTs AND REMEDIES 24 (1949).
102. Km T, A HISToRY or ENGLAND (186S).
103. ,DAIAND, EQUITY 2 et seq. (2d ed. 1936).
104. AITy-, COURT AND CHARACTER OF JAMES THE F=R (1891).
105. SPEDDum, THE WORKS or FRAxcIs Bcoiz (1864).
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jurists as Sir Thomas More, Lord Nottingham, Lord Guilford, Lord
Somers, Cowper, Harcourt, King, Talbot, Hardwicke, Northington,
Camden, Thurlow, Loughborough, Eldon, Grant, St. Leonards, West-
bury,. Selborne and Jessel.0°
The procedure in equity was begun, as has been mentioned herein-
above, by a petition. In addition, the plaintiff set forth his cause in a
"bill." Then the chancellor would issue a "subpoena," in the king's
name, to summon the opposing party, who could demur, enter a plea,
or file an "answer." The plaintiff also could, if he desired, file a "replica-
tion" to the answer. But, despite the filing of a replication, if the answer
met the bill squarely it was conclusive, unless a witness and corrobo-
rating facts, or two witnesses, opposed the statements in the replica-
tion.' 7 Then, employing the customary rules of evidence, the hearing
was conducted by an "examiner," using the method of interrogatories
and cross-interrogatories, and examining each witness separately and
privately. Then followed "the passing of publication," or an opportunity
for the parties to inspect the depositions thus gathered.10 8 Of course,
today, in England and in the United States, oral examination by a
court or examiner is customary, instead of interrogatories. A jury may
be employed to hear specific issues of fact, but its verdict is merely
advisory and is not binding on the examiner.
The Supreme Court of Judicature Act, in 1873, abolished the system
of two distinct sets of courts in England. Instead of the old separate
Chancery, King's (or Queen's) Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, Court
of Probate, Court of Divorce, and Court of Admiralty, a new High
Court of Justice was established, having five divisions, and with a Court
of Appeals above it. Later, another, higher court of last resort was
added,-the House of Lords. 00 The divisions were similar to the old
separate courts, but became parts of a single, unified system.1'0 In these
courts, in addition to their other functions, each court is required to
grant the same relief, in case of an equitable claim or defense, as would
have been granted by the old Court of Chancery. Thus, the principles
of equity now thoroughly permeate all English courts and law.
EQUITY IN THE UNITED STATES
The American colonies naturally adopted English law and procedure.
Some of the colonists brought with them, too, a hostility to the royal
106. CAMPBELL, LVES oF THE LORD CANCELIORS (Mallory ed. 1876).
107. Bisrnxm, PIRNGPmEs o, EQmurT 12 (11th ed. 1934).
108. Id. at 13.
109. Statute of 39 and 40 Vict., c. 59 (1876).
110. M -LN, LEcrTuS or EQvTrr 2 (2d ed. 1936). See also: Statute of 38 and 39
Vict., c. 77 (1875).
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power and its chief functionary, the chancellor. They had unhappy
memories of the chancery and Star Chamber proceedings, which were
closely associated in their minds with the equity courts of England."
In some of the colonies, particularly those which were established on
the proprietary pattern of control by royal governors, the governors
stood in the same relationship to the colony courts as did the king to
the English courts.11 There, the governor, or a chancellor of the gover-
nor, wielded the equity power."' In other colonies, principally in New
England, governed by legislative assemblies, usually the equity authority
was placed in the colony courts without too much concern over the fact
that these courts also wielded common law power. After the Revolu-
tionary War separate equity courts patterned after the English High
Court of Chancery were provided for in the constitutions of several
states. Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and South Caro-
lina had such provisions. 114 In Massachusetts and Pennsylvania the
contest for the equity power was not resolved until later.,, Thus, in
New Hampshire and Pennsylvania the courts had little equity power
until almost the middle of the nineteenth century, and in Maine and
Massachusetts not until the 1870's.110
The need for certainty of law, and the distrust of authority in a
pioneer society, probably had much to do with the relative unimportance
of equity in the United States in the nineteenth century."17 Its develop-
ment was slow, and in some areas practically non-existent for a long
time, nor was it highly regarded even in the legal profession generally.
As a result the common law courts took over some of equity's func-
tions."' Yet this very neglect may have been a blessing in disguise,
as it postponed the establishment of American equity principles, in many
cases, until the American courts and jurists had become more mature. 19
The Federal Constitution did provide for equity power for the federal
courts, by the method of granting to the federal courts jurisdiction at
law and in equity.1' In 1811, Story, as a Justice of the Supreme Court,
began to exert his gifted influence on federal equity.
111. PommD, Spi=r or T= Coroz" LAW 53 (1921).
112. GREGomIE, R CoRDs or nm CoURT o" CHancE.RY op Sounr CA o w;A (1950).
113. Wilson, Courts of Chancery in America, 18 Am. L. Rnv. 226 (1834).
114. BisPHAw, Pimcirx.s or EQurr" 19 (11th ed. 1934).
115. F. W. G., 31 lA Ss. L. Q. 56 (Oct. 1946); Hovm, 32 Mss. L. Q. 49 (Oct. 1947).
116. Woodruff, Chancery in 3Massachusctts, 5 L. Q. Rrv. 370 (18S9).
117. See Haskins, A Problem in the Reception of the Common Law in the Colonial
Period, 97 U. or PA. L. Rr-v. 842 (1949).
113. ScoTr AND SnhlsoN, CASES oNT JuDic A PLRmnis 614 (2d ed. 1946).
119. STORY, EQurrr Ju SPRiUsDCE § 56 (14th ed. 1918).
120. V. S. CoxsT. Art. 3, § 2. See also Morse, The Substantive Equity Historically Ap-
plied by the U. S. Cburts, 54 Dicr. L. Rtv. 10 (1949).
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The anomaly of two separate, competing systems of courts and of
law was repugnant to the fresh and practical minds of the new nation.
One who had begun proceedings in the wrong court was dismissed and
put to the needless trouble and expense of beginning all over again. 1'2 1
The obvious practicality of applying equity in common law matters to
which it might well apply, and vice-versa, required a change in the old
system, despite the resistance of established custom and a conservative
profession. In 1846 New York, where Chancellor Kent had strongly
influenced equity, took the first step when it abolished the Court of
Chancery and established a Supreme Court having the powers of the
old chancery jurisdiction as well as common law powers. 22 Missouri
followed in 1849, California in 1850, and Iowa, Kentucky and Minne-
sota in 1851.13 The distinction between legal and equitable forms of
action was abolished, and a general form of civil action was adopted.1 24
The other states followed the lead of New York in revising their own
system."z Today only five states still maintain nominally separate
equity courts. They are Delaware, Maryland (in Baltimore), Missis-
sippi, Tennessee, and Vermont.12  New Jersey, which maintained a
separate equity court until September, 1948, now also has established a
unified Superior Court. 27 Separate administration of law and of equity
within the same court is the method adopted by the states of Alabama,
Florida, Maine, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia
and West Virginia. Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, and Oregon,
though nominally code states, still require distinctive labelling (at
law, or in equity) of proceedings in their courts. All the other states,
as well as Alaska, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico,
have adopted codes similar to the Field Code, (i.e. that of New York)."12
In 1938 the Supreme Court of the United States, and the District Courts,
adopted new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for all civil matters,
wherein a single form of action is provided for all cases. 2 '
121. McReynolds, Chancery Practice and Procedure, 20 TENN. L. REv. 749 (1949).
122. N. Y. CONST. of 1846. See also Kharas, A Century of Law-Equity Merger in
New York, 1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 186 (1949); and Note, Law and Equity in New York-
Still Unnerged, 55 YALE L. J. 826 (1946).
123. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 21 (2d ed. 1947).
124. N. Y. CODE OF PROCEDURE § 69 (Field Code, 1848); Coe and Morse, Chronology
of the Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L. Q. 238 (1942).
125. HURST, TiHE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 71-88 (1950).
126. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 47 (2d ed. 1947).
127. English, New Jersey Re-organizes Its Judicial System, 34 A. B. A. J. 11 (1948);
Lewis, Equity, 4 RUTGERS L. REV. 274 (1949).
128. Ingersoll, Police Courts in London, 2 YALE L. J. 54 (1894), and CLARK, CODE
PLEADING § 8 (2d ed. 1947).
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a). 1 et seq. See also Cummings, The Functioning of Judicidl
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Under the code system which now prevails in most American juris-
dictions, while the procedural distinction between legal and equitable
actions has been changed, the inherent distinction between the two
fields of law continues. 3" It is true that all actions are begun in the
same way; the facts constituting the cause or the defense must be truly
stated; fictions in pleadings no longer are employed; and legal and
equitable actions are triable in the same courts. But there remains a
difference in essence, between the two fields, which is as marked as the
difference between actions ex contractu and those ex delicto, and cannot
be dispelled by legislative fiat.131
All a plaintiff need do, now, is set forth in his complaint a clear
statement of facts constituting his cause and a demand for the judgment
which he claims. The inherent differences between law and equity,
such as determine whether or not a trial by jury is a matter of right,
and otherwise affect the interest of litigants, remain unchanged. Ac-
cordingly, one who seeks equitable relief still must present facts en-
titling him to that form of relief, or be dismissed. Nor will it suffice
that he prove a cause of action sufficient at law. If it is insufficient
in equity, the action may be sent to the law side of the court for trial,
or may be dismissed. 3 - Equitable defenses, however, now can be en-
tered in legal actions, without asking affirmative equitable reliefVY
Equitable counterclaims often are disposed of prior to the trial of law
issues.13 4
Summing up this discussion of the nature of equity from the historical
viewpoint, it may well be said that equity is an historically inescapable
necessity. Where it does not develop by adaptation, or transplantation,
it must be improvised. Like the concept of God, if there was none, one
would have to be invented as a matter of universal necessity. Different
though its administrative manifestations may be in various places
and under varying conditions, the concept of what is right and just is,
in essence, always inevitable, if justice is not to become subordinate to
form in the law.'35
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There are some jurists, today, who seem to think it somewhat naive
to emphasize the word "justice" in legal discussions. But justice still
remains the essential purpose of all law. Equity, certainly in its histori-
cal moral sense, and hopefully in its administrative sense, is the principal
technique thus far developed to make certain that law, always will be
readily adaptable for, and directed toward, the achievement of justice.
N. Y. L. J. 22, col. 1 (editorial Jan. 3, 1951); and Pound, Progress of the Law-Equily,
33 HARV. L. Rvv. 420, 432 (1920).
